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ADAM N. SCHUPACK† 
ABSTRACT 
  The Arab-Israeli conflict has been a testing ground for the 
involvement of U.S. courts in foreign conflicts and for the concept of 
civil litigation against terrorists. Plaintiffs on both sides of the dispute 
have sought to recover damages in U.S. courts, embroiling the courts 
in one of the world’s most contentious political disputes. Plaintiffs 
bringing claims against the Palestine Liberation Organization, the 
Palestinian Authority, material supporters of terrorism, and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran have been aided by congressional statutes 
passed precisely to enhance their ability to bring such lawsuits, 
whereas plaintiffs bringing suit against Israel or Israeli leaders have 
not had the benefit of such laws. Although the courts have sought to 
give effect to the congressional authorization embodied in these 
statutes, they have faced the resistance—at times half-hearted—of the 
executive branch, which regards such legislative and judicial 
involvement as an intrusion on its foreign policy prerogatives. 
Though these lawsuits have been subject to criticism and have not 
fully achieved the goals attributed to them, U.S. courts have largely 
acted within the authority given them by Congress and the executive 
branch in hearing the suits, and there is at least some evidence that 
such lawsuits constitute an effective tool in the fight against terrorism.  
INTRODUCTION 
Alisa Flatow, a twenty-year-old Brandeis University student 
studying in Israel, was killed on April 9, 1995, when Palestinian 
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Islamic Jihad terrorists blew up the bus in which she was traveling in 
the Gaza Strip.1 On April 18, 1996, Saadallah Ali Belhas’s wife 
Zeineb and nine of their children were killed when an errant Israeli 
shell hit the U.N. compound at Qana, Lebanon, where they were 
sheltering from Israel’s Operation Grapes of Wrath against 
Hezbollah fighters.2 What separates these victims and their families 
from thousands of others who have died in the course of the Arab-
Israeli conflict is that their families sought justice through private civil 
litigation in the United States. Using statutes intended to combat 
terrorism and human rights violations, these plaintiffs and others like 
them have forced U.S. courts to confront the contentious Arab-Israeli 
conflict.3 
In light of that dispute’s central role in U.S. foreign policy and 
international politics, this Note takes the conflict as its starting point. 
In doing so, it offers a new approach to analyzing how U.S. courts 
have dealt with civil suits related to terrorism in the context of a 
conflict laden with foreign policy concerns. Prior scholarship has 
tended to focus on particular statutes,4 particular cases,5 or the general 
concept of civil litigation against terrorism.6 In contrast, this Note 
begins with the conflict and proceeds to examine related civil cases 
brought in U.S. courts. 
 
 1. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1998). For a more 
thorough discussion of this case, see infra Part III. 
 2. Belhas v. Ya’alon, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, http://ccrjustice.org/ 
ourcases/current-cases/belhas-v.-ya’alon (last visited Aug. 30, 2010); see also Belhas v. Ya’alon, 
515 F.3d 1279, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2008). For additional discussion, see infra Part IV. 
 3. As used in this Note, the Arab-Israeli conflict means not only the conflict between 
Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews, but also the wider conflict between the State of Israel, Arab 
and Muslim countries, and nonstate actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas. The term Arab-Israeli 
conflict is used with the knowledge that Iran—referred to throughout as a participant in the 
conflict—is not an Arab nation. 
 4. See, e.g., S. Jason Baletsa, Comment, The Cost of Closure: A Reexamination of the 
Theory and Practice of the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 148 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1247, 1300 (2000) (arguing that the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2006), is a “futile weapon”). 
 5. See, e.g., Graham Ogilvy, Note, Belhas v. Ya’alon: The Case for a Jus Cogens Exception 
to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 8 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 169, 169 (2009) (arguing that 
because “General Ya’alon’s actions constitute serious jus cogens violations” the D.C. Circuit 
should not have extended Israel’s sovereign immunity to his conduct). 
 6. See, e.g., John Norton Moore, Introduction to CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM 
3, 5 (John Norton Moore ed., 2004) (arguing that in light of universal condemnation of terrorism 
“it is hardly a stretch to ask how the civil justice system might more effectively also contribute to 
deterrence against such heinous acts” (emphasis omitted)). 
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The purpose of this approach is twofold. First, the Note 
categorizes different types of U.S. civil cases that are connected with 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. After discussing the factual background of 
one or more important cases in each category, this Note examines 
how courts have handled that category of cases. Second, the Note 
analyzes how courts have resolved cases in these different categories 
and the impact of those decisions on the broader concept of civil 
litigation against terrorism. 
Part I examines civil suits against the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA), the first 
kind of litigation brought in U.S. courts related to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.7 Part II reviews civil actions against nonstate material 
supporters of terrorism, focusing on attempts by David Boim’s 
parents to hold U.S.-based funders of the Palestinian terrorist group 
Hamas liable for their son’s murder. Part III discusses suits against 
Iran under the state sponsor of terrorism exception to the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),8 including Stephen Flatow’s 
attempt to hold the Iranian government liable for funding the 
Palestinian terrorists who murdered his daughter. Part IV looks at 
suits against Israel and Israeli leaders under the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS),9 including attempts by Saadallah Belhas and others to sue 
Israeli General Moshe Ya’alon for the shelling of Qana. Part V 
examines the efforts of the family of Rachel Corrie—a U.S. citizen 
killed by an Israeli bulldozer—to hold Caterpillar, the bulldozer’s 
U.S. manufacturer, liable. Part VI offers some preliminary 
conclusions derived from an examination of the different categories 
of cases. Finally, Part VII examines how these cases inform the 
concept of private civil litigation against terrorism, which has 
advanced beyond the confines of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a tool to 
combat terrorism in general.10 The Note concludes that U.S. courts 
have proven competent to adjudicate complex issues related to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and that, despite numerous problems with these 
 
 7. The order of presentation in the Note does not imply any judgment about the relative 
importance of the categories discussed. 
 8. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2006). 
 9. ATS, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 10. The definition of “terrorism” is beyond the scope of this Note. Instead, this Note 
examines how courts have construed different acts of violence related to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and how this characterization impacts civil litigation against terrorism—as that term is 
understood in the statutes authorizing such suits. 
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cases, abandoning civil litigation against terrorism would be 
premature. 
I.  SUITS AGAINST THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION 
AND THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY 
This Part will examine civil lawsuits filed in U.S. courts against 
the Palestine Liberation Organization11 and the Palestinian 
Authority12 over their alleged involvement in terrorism. It will trace 
the evolution of the role of U.S. courts both before and after the 
passage of the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 (ATA),13 which provides a 
cause of action to U.S. citizens injured by acts of international 
terrorism.14 In the cases decided before the passage of the ATA—Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic15 and Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille 
Lauro16—the courts struggled to determine which legal principles to 
apply. In contrast, Knox v. PLO (Knox I),17 decided after the passage 
of the ATA, is one of many suits brought by U.S. citizens in which 
courts have imposed liability on the PA and PLO for acts of 
terrorism.18 
 
 11. The PLO was founded in 1964 as the umbrella organization of the Palestinian national 
liberation movement. Palestine Liberation Organization: Introduction, PERMANENT OBSERVER 
MISSION OF PALESTINE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.int/palestine/ 
theplointro.shtml (last visited Aug. 30, 2010). 
 12. The PA was established as the governing body of the Palestinian Territories pursuant 
to the Oslo Accords, signed by Israel and the PLO in 1993. The Oslo Accords, 1993, OFF. OF 
THE HISTORIAN, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1990-2000/Oslo (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2010); see also Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, Isr.-PLO, 32 I.L.M. 1525 (establishing a framework for the 
creation of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority). The PA is not a member of the 
United Nations, Non-Member States and Entities, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/ 
members/nonmembers.shtml (last updated Feb. 29, 2008), nor is it recognized as an independent 
state by the United States, Independent States in the World, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (July 29, 
2009), http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm. 
 13. ATA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2339D (2006). 
 14. Id. § 2333(a) (“Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, 
or business by reason of an act of international terrorism . . . may sue therefor in any 
appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she 
sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees.”). 
 15. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam). 
 16. Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 17. Knox v. PLO (Knox I), 306 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 248 F.R.D. 420 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 18. See infra note 53. 
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A. Suits Prior to the Implementation of the ATA 
The first major attempt to sue the PLO in a U.S. court was Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, a D.C. Circuit case in which a group 
of mainly Israeli citizens brought a claim against, among others, Libya 
and the PLO for a 1978 terrorist attack on an Israeli bus.19 The 
plaintiffs filed suit under the ATS,20 which permits an alien to sue in 
U.S. courts for torts committed against the law of nations.21 In 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,22 decided a few years prior to Tel-Oren, the 
Second Circuit had given new life to this largely unused provision.23 
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the suit 
in Tel-Oren, with all three judges on the panel writing separate 
concurring opinions.24 Judge Harry Edwards reasoned that because 
the PLO was not a recognized state,25 it could not be held to violate 
international law regarding torture under Filartiga.26 He also 
determined that terrorism did not “amount to [a] law of nations 
violation[].”27 Judge Robert Bork held that the ATS was only 
jurisdictional and did not create a cause of action permitting the 
plaintiffs to sue.28 He was also concerned that a ruling on the PLO’s 
liability for the attack could interfere with U.S. foreign policy.29 
Finally, he believed that the plaintiffs had not stated a claim for a 
 
 19. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775. 
 20. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 21. Id. (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for 
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”). 
 22. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 23. See id. at 887 (“Although the Alien Tort Statute has rarely been the basis for 
jurisdiction during its long history . . . there can be little doubt that this action is properly 
brought in federal court.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 24. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775 (Edwards, J., concurring); id. at 798 (Bork, J., concurring); id. 
at 823 (Robb, J., concurring). 
 25. Id. at 791 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
 26. Id. at 787. 
 27. Id. The lack of international consensus regarding the permissibility of terrorism 
convinced Judge Edwards that the law of nations had not yet “outlaw[ed] politically motivated 
terrorism.” Id. at 796. 
 28. Id. at 799 (Bork, J., concurring). Judge Bork, citing Blackstone, believed that the ATS 
was originally concerned with “[v]iolation[s] of safeconducts,” “[i]nfringement of the rights of 
embassadors,” and “[p]iracy.” Id. at 813 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*68, *72). The Supreme Court has subsequently adopted a similar view, holding that 
contemporary ATS claims must “rest on a norm of international character accepted by the 
civilized world and defined with specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century 
paradigms we have recognized.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004). 
 29. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 805 (Bork, J., concurring). 
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violation of customary international law because there was no 
international consensus regarding the definition of terrorism.30 Judge 
Roger Robb held the entire suit nonjusticiable under the political 
question doctrine because “[i]nternational terrorism consists of a web 
that the courts are not positioned to unweave,” and they would be 
interfering in U.S. foreign policy if they tried.31 
A year after Tel-Oren was decided, terrorists seized the Italian 
passenger ship Achille Lauro in the Mediterranean Sea and murdered 
a wheelchair-bound U.S. passenger, Leon Klinghoffer.32 His wife and 
daughters sued the PLO, whom they alleged to be responsible for the 
hijacking, as well as the shipowner and trip organizer, who impleaded 
the PLO.33 The PLO moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction and for nonjusticiability.34 
The district court found that it had subject matter jurisdiction 
under both the federal admiralty jurisdiction statute35 and the Death 
on the High Seas Act36 because the alleged terrorist activities 
occurred on a ship in navigable waters.37 It had personal jurisdiction 
under state law based on the presence of the PLO’s U.N. mission in 
New York.38 Moreover, the court rejected the PLO’s argument that 
Tel-Oren stood for the proposition that suits against it were 
nonjusticiable political questions,39 characterizing the matter before it 
as an “act[] of piracy” within its jurisdiction.40 
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the PLO’s argument that 
it qualified for immunity as a sovereign state under the FSIA.41 The 
Second Circuit also upheld the district court’s refusal to apply the 
political question doctrine to “an ordinary tort suit.”42 Relying on 
 
 30. Id. at 806–07. 
 31. Id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring). 
 32. Judith Miller, Hijackers Yield Ship in Egypt; Passenger Slain, 400 are Safe; U.S. Assails 
Deal with Captors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1985, at A1. 
 33. Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854, 856–57 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 34. Id. at 858. 
 35. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006). 
 36. Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761–768 (1982) (current version at 46 U.S.C. 
§§ 30301–30308 (2006)). 
 37. Klinghoffer, 739 F. Supp. at 858–59. 
 38. Id. at 863. 
 39. Id. at 860. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 47–48 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1602–1611 (1988)). 
 42. Id. at 49–50. 
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Supreme Court precedent, the court wrote that “the doctrine is one of 
‘political questions,’ not . . . ‘political cases.’”43 The court also 
reasoned that the political branches “have expressly endorsed the 
concept of suing terrorist organizations in federal courts.”44 
Nevertheless, the court remanded on personal jurisdiction and service 
of process grounds, determining that only the PLO’s non-U.N. related 
activities could be the basis of jurisdiction.45 After several years of 
litigation, the PLO reportedly settled the case with the Klinghoffer 
family.46 
B. The Antiterrorism Act 
Klinghoffer spurred the passage of the Antiterrorism Act of 
1990.47 Many in Congress viewed the result of the Klinghoffer suit 
favorably and were concerned that only admiralty jurisdiction and 
fortuitous PLO contact with New York allowed it to proceed.48 Many 
members of Congress also felt that such suits should be permitted 
more broadly against the perpetrators of terrorist attacks.49 Thus, 
Congress passed the ATA, which provides that “[a]ny national of the 
United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by 
reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or 
her . . . survivors . . . may sue” in U.S. district court.50 The ATA 
permits successful plaintiffs to collect treble damages and attorney’s 
fees.51 Use of the ATA was infrequent, however, until recently.52 
 
 43. Id. at 49 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). 
 44. Id. at 49–50 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 2333(a) (West Supp. 1990) (current version at 18 
U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2006)); Letter from Abraham D. Sofaer, Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. 
Dep’t. of State, to Carmen B. Ciparick, Justice, N.Y. Supreme Court (Sept. 4, 1986)). 
 45. Id. at 50–51. 
 46. Benjamin Weiser, A Settlement with P.L.O. over Terror on a Cruise, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
12, 1997, at A6. 
 47. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2339D (2006). The ATA was originally enacted in 1990, but it was 
repealed and reenacted in 1992 due to an enrolling error. Id. ch. 113B codification note. 
 48. H.R. REP. NO. 102-1040, at 5 (1992). 
 49. Id.; see also 137 CONG. REC. S8143 (1991) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“The ATA 
removes the jurisdictional hurdles in the courts confronting victims and it empowers victims 
with all the weapons available in civil litigation . . . .”). 
 50. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a); see also H.R. REP. NO. 102-1040, at 5 (noting that the statute 
intends “to facilitate civil actions” against international terrorism and to extend “civil 
jurisdiction to accommodate the reach of international terrorism”). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Debra M. Strauss, Enlisting the U.S. Courts in a New Front: Dismantling the 
International Business Holdings of Terrorist Groups Through Federal Statutory and Common-
Law Suits, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 679, 684 (2005); see also John F. Murphy, Civil Lawsuits 
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C. Suits against the PA and PLO under the ATA 
In 2002, a Palestinian gunman burst into a bat mitzvah reception 
in Hadera, Israel, killing six—including Aharon Ellis, a U.S. citizen 
who was singing with the band at the celebration.53 Alleging that the 
PA and PLO were responsible for the attack, Ellis’s decedents sued 
them under the ATA.54 The PA and PLO moved to dismiss the case 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity 
and for nonjusticiability,55 but the district court denied the defendants’ 
motion.56 The court rejected the defendants’ argument that they were 
entitled to sovereign immunity for two reasons. First, the court held 
that the PLO and PA did not meet the criteria for statehood because 
they lacked control over a defined territory and the capacity to 
engage in foreign relations.57 Alternatively, the court held that it could 
not grant sovereign immunity in the absence of executive branch 
recognition.58 
The district court’s rejection of the defendants’ nonjusticiability 
argument rested on the maxim that “the doctrine is one of ‘political 
questions,’ not one of ‘political cases’”59 and on Klinghoffer’s finding 
that a suit for injuries suffered as a result of a terrorist attack is a 
“common law tort claim[]” that is “‘constitutionally committed’ to the 
judicial branch.”60 Congress’s creation of a statutory basis for these 
suits—the ATA—was also significant to the court.61 Yet the court 
expressed concern that each side was seeking to manipulate the case 
 
as a Legal Response to International Terrorism, in CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM, 
supra note 6, at 35, 42–43 (“[T]he ATA has been a form of ‘stealth’ legislation, largely ignored 
until recently.”). 
 53. Knox v. PLO (Knox I), 306 F. Supp. 2d 424, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 248 F.R.D. 
420 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). This Note discusses Knox because the PA subsequently moved for relief 
from judgment in this case. Knox does not otherwise differ significantly from other cases 
brought against the PA and PLO. E.g., Ungar v. PLO, 402 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2005); Sokolow v. 
PLO, 583 F. Supp. 2d 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 424 F. Supp. 
2d 153 (D.D.C. 2006); Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 422 F. Supp. 2d 96 
(D.D.C. 2006); Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 310 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D.D.C. 
2004). 
 54. Knox I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 427. 
 55. Id. at 426. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 429, 434–38 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1987)). 
 58. Id. at 448 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964)). 
 59. Id. at 449 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). 
 60. Id. (quoting Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49–50 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
 61. Id. 
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for its own political ends. Cautioning that its examination was limited 
and focused, the court emphasized that its responsibilities did not 
include “answer[ing] . . . these broader and intractable political 
questions which form the backdrop to this lawsuit.”62 Rather, the 
court’s job was limited to “adjudicat[ing] whether and to what extent 
the plaintiffs may recover against the defendants under certain causes 
of action for the violence that occurred in Hadera.”63 After losing 
their motion to dismiss, the PA and PLO decided not to continue 
litigating the case, resulting in a default judgment in excess of $192 
million.64 
Following default judgments in Knox I and several other cases,65 
the Palestinian leadership instituted a change in policy. The new 
Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, announced to Secretary of 
State Condoleeza Rice that the PA and PLO now intended to litigate 
these suits.66 Pursuant to this new policy, the PA and PLO filed a 
motion for relief from the Knox I judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, citing their change of leadership 
and legal strategy (Knox II).67 The PA and PLO presented 
“evidence . . . that, if proven at a trial, would constitute a complete 
defense to Plaintiffs’ aiding and abetting theory of liability.”68 The PA 
and PLO also asked the U.S. government to file a statement of 
interest with the court, which the U.S. government, although 
expressing concern about the judgment’s impact on Palestinian 
finances, declined to do.69 Despite the U.S. government’s abstention 
from direct involvement in the case, the court granted the motion,70 
 
 62. Id. at 448. 
 63. Id. 
 64. The statute stipulates that any successful plaintiff “shall recover threefold the damages 
he or she sustains and the cost of the suit.” 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2006). A default judgment of 
$192,740,660.13 was entered on August 1, 2006. Knox v. PLO (Knox II), 248 F.R.D. 420, 423–24 
(2008). 
 65. E.g., Ungar v. PLO, 402 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 66. Knox II, 248 F.R.D. at 424–25. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 428. 
 69. Glenn Kessler, Administration Won’t Take Sides in Terrorism Case Against 
Palestinians, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2008, at A16 (noting that, while the Bush administration was 
concerned that such lawsuits could harm the “financial and political viability” of the PA, 
“[g]overnment lawyers decided that the Palestinian Authority had had sufficient opportunities 
to contest the Knox verdict” and that “the administration . . . did not want to appear indifferent 
to terrorism victims’ needs”). 
 70. Knox II, 248 F.R.D. at 433; see also Benjamin Weiser, Palestinians Get 2nd Try in 
Terror Suit, But at a Price, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2008, at B1 (“The lawyer for Mr. Ellis’s 
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noting the changing political dynamic of the PA, the new leadership’s 
commitment to litigate in good faith, and the size of the judgment.71 
Rather than litigate the case, however, the PLO and PA decided to 
settle it, paying an undisclosed sum to the plaintiffs.72 
This review of suits against the PLO and PA shows how courts’ 
handling of such cases has evolved with the passage of the ATA. 
First, prior to the enactment of the ATA, Tel-Oren affirmed the 
dismissal of a suit against the PLO. Following the enactment of the 
ATA, courts have generally followed the direction of Congress in 
permitting these suits to go forward, construing them as ordinary tort 
suits and not applying the political question doctrine. Second, it is 
critical in these cases that the PA and the PLO do not enjoy sovereign 
immunity and that the executive branch has refrained from arguing 
for their dismissal. Third, though the PA and PLO’s failure to contest 
these suits has in the past resulted in courts entering default 
judgments on the basis of uncontested evidence, the Palestinian 
leadership’s recent commitment to litigating these cases indicates that 
courts may soon be called upon to more completely adjudicate these 
cases on the merits.73 If these cases are litigated on the merits, Knox 
suggests that plaintiffs may not be able to win them. Fourth, the size 
of the judgments and lack of attachable PLO and PA assets has made 
it difficult for plaintiffs to collect on their judgments.74 The recent 
decision by the PA and PLO to settle the Knox case, however, 
indicates that these suits may in fact be an effective tool in the fight 
against terrorism.75 
II.  BOIM: SUITS AGAINST MATERIAL SUPPORTERS OF TERRORISM 
This Part examines suits against private material supporters of 
terrorism under the ATA through the lens of Boim v. Quranic 
 
family . . . believes the defendants are misleading the court and concealing property . . . .”). The 
court ultimately required the posting of a $120 million bond. Knox v. PLO (Knox III), 628 F. 
Supp. 2d 507, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 71. Knox II, 248 F.R.D. at 430–31. 
 72. Josh Gerstein, Palestinians Reverse on Terror Victim, POLITICO (Feb. 15, 2010, 11:56 
PM EST), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0210/33021.html. 
 73. Compare Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 675 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 
(D.D.C. 2009) (vacating a default judgment entered against the PA and PLO), with Biton v. 
Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 252 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2008) (expressly refusing to follow 
Knox in vacating a default judgment entered against the PA and PLO). 
 74. See Weiser, supra note 70 (describing the precarious financial situation of the PA). 
 75. See Gerstein, supra note 72 (noting that the PA may have settled another case that was 
abruptly dropped in 2008). 
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Literacy Institute.76 After laying out the facts of Boim, it discusses the 
Seventh Circuit’s conflicting interpretations of the breadth of material 
support liability and the impact of such liability on the First 
Amendment rights of alleged violators. 
David Boim, a dual Israeli-U.S. citizen, was murdered in a 1996 
West Bank shooting attack, allegedly by Hamas terrorists.77 His 
parents sued a number of individuals and organizations in federal 
court under the ATA, including alleged U.S.-based Hamas supporters 
Muhammad Salah, the Quranic Literacy Institute (QLI), the Holy 
Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), the Islamic 
Association for Palestine (IAP), and the American Muslim Society 
(AMS).78 The Boims alleged that Salah, a naturalized U.S. citizen, was 
the U.S.-based leader of the military wing of Hamas, and that HLF, 
whose assets the United States froze in 2001, supplied funds to 
Hamas.79 AMS and IAP, which were found to be one organization, 
allegedly supported Hamas through HLF.80 The plaintiffs alleged that 
QLI, for whom Salah worked, was also a Hamas front organization.81 
The district court granted summary judgment against HLF, 
 
 76. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim II), 340 F. Supp. 2d 885 (N.D. Ill. 2004), vacated 
sub nom. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 511 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2007), vacated, 
549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009). Although Boim, like 
Knox, was brought under the ATA, this Note classifies it separately because suits against 
private parties have a lesser impact upon foreign policy. The U.S. government also expressed 
support for the use of the ATA in the Boim case. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Affirmance at 2, Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) (Nos. 
01-1969, 01-1970). Another line of cases involves suits by more than 1,600 plaintiffs against the 
Jordan-based Arab Bank for allegedly funneling money from wealthy Saudis through its New 
York office to the families of Palestinian terrorists in the West Bank and Gaza. Lev v. Arab 
Bank, PLC, No. 08 CV 3251(NG)(VVP), 2010 WL 623636 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010); Litle v. 
Arab Bank, PLC, 611 F. Supp. 2d 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 
2d 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Weiss v. Arab Bank, PLC, 06 CV 1623(NG)(VVP), 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 94029 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2007); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005). Plaintiffs have also attempted to bring similar suits against the Swiss bank 
UBS with mixed results. Compare Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414 (E.D.N.Y. 
2009) (refusing to dismiss suit against UBS), with Rothstein v. UBS AG, 647 F. Supp. 2d 292, 
294 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (dismissing suit against UBS). 
 77. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim III), 511 F.3d 707, 711 (7th Cir. 
2007), vacated, 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009). 
 78. Boim II, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 890. Salah’s name appears as both “Mohammed” and 
“Muhammad.” Compare id. at 890 (“Mohammed”), with id. at 922 (“Muhammad”). 
 79. Boim III, 511 F.3d at 712–13. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 713–14. QLI’s ostensible mission was translating Islamic texts into English. Id. at 
714. 
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AMS/IAP, and Salah; a jury found QLI liable as well.82 The jury 
awarded $52 million in damages, which the court trebled to $156 
million pursuant to the ATA.83 
On direct appeal (Boim III), the two major issues were the 
availability of aiding and abetting liability for acts of terrorism under 
the ATA and the showing required to hold the defendants liable. The 
Seventh Circuit had previously ruled on these questions in an 
interlocutory appeal (Boim I).84 In that decision, the court held that 
aiding and abetting liability was available under the ATA, even 
though the statute did not expressly provide for it, because “Congress 
expressed an intent . . . to import general tort law principles, and 
those principles include aiding and abetting liability.”85 Thus, the 
court explained, the holding would be consistent with the 
congressional “purpose of cutting off the flow of money to terrorists 
at every point along the chain of causation.”86 The Court thus 
distinguished Boim from Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,87 in which the Supreme Court held 
that there was no private right of action for aiding and abetting 
liability unless explicitly mentioned in the statute.88 In addition, the 
court determined that the Boims would have “to show[, first,] 
knowledge of and intent to further” Hamas terrorism, not just 
funding of it,89 and second, “that murder was a reasonably foreseeable 
result of making a donation.”90 The court reasoned that this 
requirement would be consistent with the “intent by Congress to 
codify general common law tort principles and to extend civil liability 
for acts of international terrorism to the full reaches of traditional tort 
law.”91 
 
 82. Id. at 710. Although QLI received a jury trial, the court limited the evidence the Boims 
needed to present to establish QLI’s liability, including through a finding of fact that Hamas had 
killed David Boim. Id. at 719. 
 83. Id. at 719. 
 84. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002). This 
interlocutory appeal arose from Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (N.D. 
Ill. 2001). 
 85. Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1019. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 
(1994). 
 88. Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1017 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 174). 
 89. Id. at 1011. 
 90. Id. at 1012. 
 91. Id. at 1010. 
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In a 2 to 1 decision, the same panel of the Seventh Circuit that 
heard the interlocutory appeal reversed the district court’s application 
of its principles (Boim III).92 The panel believed that the district court 
had erred in failing to require the Boims to show that the defendants’ 
actions were a cause in fact of their son’s death.93 
The Seventh Circuit sitting en banc, however, vacated the panel’s 
decision.94 Revisiting the issue of aiding and abetting liability under 
the ATA, Judge Richard Posner returned to the Central Bank of 
Denver standard,95 holding that “statutory silence on the subject of 
secondary liability means there is none.”96 Instead, through a “chain 
of explicit statutory incorporations by reference,” he found “that a 
donation to a terrorist group that targets Americans outside the 
United States may violate” the ATA.97 This was “[p]rimary liability” 
with “the character of secondary liability.”98 Thus, one who provided 
material support after the enactment of the statute criminalizing such 
support99 and knew that the funds would be used to carry out acts of 
terrorism against U.S. citizens overseas could be liable under the 
ATA.100 Because Salah was in an Israeli prison between the effective 
date of the statute and Boim’s killing, the court reversed the 
judgment against him.101 
At the same time, the en banc majority believed that the panel 
had set the standard for knowledge and causation too high.102 Judge 
Posner likened liability for the provision of material support to 
terrorists to liability for fires with multiple origins,103 writing that in 
such cases “the requirement of proving causation is relaxed because 
 
 92. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim III), 511 F.3d 707, 710 (7th Cir. 
2007), vacated, 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009). 
 93. Id. at 741. 
 94. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim IV), 549 F.3d 685, 705 (7th Cir. 
2008) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009). 
 95. See discussion supra notes 87–88. 
 96. Boim IV, 549 F.3d at 689. 
 97. Id. at 690. This chain stretched from 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) to 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) to 18 
U.S.C. § 2339A to 18 U.S.C. § 2332. Boim IV, 549 F.3d at 690. 
 98. Boim IV, 549 F.3d at 691. 
 99. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006). 
 100. Boim IV, 549 F.3d at 691. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 702. 
 103. See id. at 695 (describing cases in which a defendant was found liable for starting a fire 
that combined with another fire of unknown cause and destroyed the plaintiff’s property, for 
example Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927)).  
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otherwise there would be a wrong and an injury but no remedy 
because the court would be unable to determine which wrongdoer 
inflicted the injury.”104 Thus, if one contributed to Hamas knowingly 
or recklessly, thereby “significantly enhanc[ing] the risk of terrorist 
acts and thus the probability that the plaintiff’s decedent would be a 
victim,” one could be liable.105 Judge Posner concluded that only two 
types of support were excepted from liability: donations to charities 
by individuals who did not know or were not reckless in failing to 
discover that the charity gives money to terrorists and contributions 
to medical organizations that assist all individuals.106 
Applying these principles to the other defendants, the court 
upheld the district court’s judgments against AMS/IAP and QLI.107 
The court held that AMS/IAP knew it was giving money to Hamas, 
which was sufficient to hold it liable.108 The court also found that 
despite the district court’s finding of fact that Hamas was responsible 
for Boim’s murder, the jury nevertheless found QLI liable on the 
question of material support to Hamas.109 QLI waived its ability to 
object, however, by its refusal to fully participate at trial.110 
Not all of the Seventh Circuit judges agreed with Judge Posner’s 
interpretation. The dissenting judges were concerned about the 
potential scope of liability under the majority’s decision and about the 
decision’s possible impact on the defendants’ First Amendment 
rights.111 The dissent contended that the majority departed from tort 
principles by not requiring the plaintiffs to show causation and the 
intent to fund terrorism.112 This expansive tort liability would make it 
difficult for courts to draw distinctions between purposeful and 
unintentional funding of terrorism,113 which could implicate First 
Amendment freedoms by criminalizing donations to an organization 
that engages in both legal and illegal activity or, unlike Hamas, is not 
 
 104. Id. at 697. 
 105. Id. at 698. 
 106. Id. at 699 (naming the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders as such organizations). 
 107. Id. at 701. The court reversed the verdict against HLF on the ground that the district 
court should not have collaterally estopped HLF from challenging a D.C. Circuit finding that it 
had funded Hamas. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 702. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 705–06 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 724–25 
(Wood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 112. Id. at 705 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 113. Id. 
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designated as a terrorist organization.114 The dissent contended that 
the majority’s approach could also lead to liability solely for 
advocating on behalf of or showing affiliation with a terrorist group.115 
There are several preliminary conclusions that one can draw 
from the admittedly small number of cases in this category, including 
Boim and a series of suits against the Arab Bank for allegedly 
funneling money to Palestinian terrorists.116 First, despite a lack of 
international consensus on the definition of terrorism,117 many U.S. 
courts appear willing to use the definition of terrorism that Congress 
has provided.118 Second, it is difficult for plaintiffs to establish 
causation and liability in material support cases because of the 
shadowy nature of terrorist financing networks. Third, given the 
frequently indirect nature of this material support, scope of liability is 
often an issue, especially with regard to contributions to groups that 
have both terroristic and political or charitable branches. The 
Supreme Court, however, has recently upheld the constitutionality of 
the material-support statute against a First Amendment challenge 
brought by U.S.-based organizations and individuals who wished to 
provide support to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the 
Tamil Tigers (LTTE), both of which the United States has designated 
as terrorist organizations.119 The Court held that the judgment of 
Congress and the executive branch in criminalizing material support 
was entitled to deference.120 
 
 114. Id. at 713. 
 115. Id. at 713–14 (“[A]n individual may not be held . . . liable for his mere association with 
an organization whose members engage in illegal acts.” Id. (citing NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982)). 
 116. More than 1,600 plaintiffs have filed suit against the Jordan-based bank. E.g., Litle v. 
Arab Bank, PLC, 611 F. Supp. 2d 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 
2d 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Weiss v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 06 CV 1623(NG)(VVP), 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 94029 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2007); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 117. See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in Our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban 
Guilt, and the Asymmetries of the International Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1, 53–54 (2002) 
(“[T]here is no precisely agreed upon international definition of terrorism as a crime.”). 
 118. See, e.g., Boim IV, 549 F.3d at 690 (using the statutory definitions of terrorism provided 
by Congress to find that liability exists for providing support to terrorist organizations targeting 
Americans outside the United States). 
 119. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2722–30 (2010). 
 120. Id. at 2728 (“At bottom, plaintiffs simply disagree with the considered judgment of 
Congress and the Executive that providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist 
organization—even seemingly benign support—bolsters the terrorist activities of that 
organization. That judgment, however, is entitled to significant weight, and we have persuasive 
evidence before us to sustain it.”). 
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III.  SUITS AGAINST IRAN 
Although some plaintiffs have successfully held private parties 
civilly liable for aiding terrorism, more plaintiffs have chosen to sue a 
state—the Islamic Republic of Iran—over its support of terrorism. 
This Part describes how Congress has abrogated the sovereign 
immunity of Iran to permit such suits. It then discusses the foremost 
example of this trend: Stephen Flatow’s attempt to hold Iran 
accountable for the murder of his daughter in a bus bombing in the 
Gaza Strip.121 
A. The State Sponsor of Terrorism Exception to FSIA 
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides the exclusive 
basis for subject matter and personal jurisdiction in suits against 
foreign nations,122 and U.S. courts only have jurisdiction under the 
FSIA if one of the exceptions to immunity applies.123 Concerned 
about the ability of state sponsors of terrorism to hide behind 
sovereign immunity, Congress amended the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act to abrogate their sovereign immunity as part of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).124 
Though the executive branch initially objected to the bill, President 
Bill Clinton signed it into law.125 This abrogation of immunity applied 
only to those countries on the State Department’s list of state 
sponsors of terrorism.126 The State Sponsor of Terrorism Amendment, 
however, proved insufficient to enable Flatow to bring his lawsuit, so 
 
 121. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 122. Id. at 11 (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1983)). 
 123. Id. (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 
(1989)). The exceptions to immunity include waiver; commercial activity carried out by a 
foreign state; personal injury, death, or damage to property occurring in the U.S. caused by a 
tortious act or omission of the foreign state or one of its officials, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2006), 
as well as sponsorship of terrorism, id. § 1605A (Supp. II 2008). 
 124. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241–43 (amending 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1605, a part of FSIA). 
 125. See Murphy, supra note 52, at 80–81 (noting that the U.S. Departments of State and 
Justice “strongly opposed” the FSIA amendments). 
 126. 28 U.S.C. § 1605. These states are listed at the State Department’s recommendation 
under three separate statutory bases: 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(j), 22 U.S.C. § 2371, and 22 U.S.C. 
§ 2780(d). There are only four countries currently on the list: Iran, Cuba, Sudan, and Syria. State 
Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (last visited 
Aug. 30, 2010). Iraq was removed from the list in 2004, Presidential Determination No. 2004-52, 
3 C.F.R. 295 (2005), Libya in 2006, Presidential Determination No. 2006-14, 3 C.F.R. 283 (2007), 
and North Korea in 2008, Memorandum of June 26, 2008, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2009). 
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Congress responded by passing another bill, known as the Flatow 
Amendment, that allowed civil litigation for acts of state-sponsored 
terrorism.127 The Flatow Amendment provided an explicit cause of 
action to U.S. nationals or their representatives seeking to sue 
“an . . . official, employee, or agent of a foreign state” under the State 
Sponsor of Terrorism Amendment.128 It also made punitive damages 
available.129 
In 2008, the State Sponsor of Terrorism Amendment and the 
Flatow Amendment were both repealed and replaced with a new 
section, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A.130 The new statute includes an exception 
to sovereign immunity for state sponsors of terrorism and a cause of 
action for victims of terrorism and their decedents.131 The cause of 
action is broader, explicitly including foreign terrorist states in 
addition to their agents, officials, and employees.132 In addition to 
specifying that punitive damages are available, the new law also 
provides for the attachment of the property of a foreign state even if 
the state does not directly control the property.133 
B. The Flatow Case 
Twenty-year-old American student Alisa Flatow was murdered 
in an April 9, 1995, terrorist attack on an Israeli bus in the Gaza 
Strip.134 The Shaqaqi faction of the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) 
 
 127. Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. a, § 589, 
110 Stat. 3009, 3009-172 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note); see also Jack Goldsmith & 
Ryan Goodman, U.S. Civil Litigation and International Terrorism, in CIVIL LITIGATION 
AGAINST TERRORISM, supra note 6, at 137 (discussing the Flatow Amendment). Stephen 
Flatow’s lawsuit is discussed in more detail in Part III.B, infra. 
 128. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note. 
 129. Id. 
 130. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083, 
122 Stat. 3, 338 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (Supp. II 2008)); see also JENNIFER K. ELSEA, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SUITS AGAINST TERRORIST STATES BY VICTIMS OF TERRORISM 48–
62 (2008) (describing the changes implemented in the new legislation). 
 131. ELSEA, supra note 130, at 48–49 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1605A). 
 132. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1998). Although this Note 
focuses on Flatow, other cases connected with the Arab-Israeli conflict have been filed against 
Iran. Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 667 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2009); Wachsman v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 603 F. Supp. 2d 148 (D.D.C. 2009); Beer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 574 F. 
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008); Kirschenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 572 F. Supp. 2d 200 
(D.D.C. 2008); Ben-Rafael v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 540 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D.D.C. 2008); 
Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 507 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D.D.C. 2007); Sisso v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, No. 1:05CV394(JDB), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48526 (D.D.C. July 5, 2007); 
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claimed responsibility.135 Stephen Flatow, Alisa’s father, filed a 
wrongful death suit under the FSIA’s State Sponsor of Terrorism 
Amendment and the Flatow Amendment136 against the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security 
(MOIS), and three Iranian leaders.137 Although served with process, 
the defendants did not appear.138  
Pursuant to the FSIA, Flatow needed to provide satisfactory 
evidence to establish his right to relief.139 Flatow presented evidence 
of the State Department’s conclusion that the PIJ had perpetrated the 
bombing and received about $2 million annually from Iran.140 Iran, 
which was designated a state sponsor of terrorism in 1984, was found 
to have provided “material support and resources to [PIJ]” through 
the MOIS with the approval of the individual defendants.141 The court 
concluded that “Alisa Michelle Flatow’s death was caused by a willful 
and deliberate act of extrajudicial killing . . . by . . . the [PIJ] acting 
under the direction of [the] [d]efendants.”142 
The district court read the State Sponsor of Terrorism 
Amendment and the Flatow Amendment together.143 Because 
“Congress has expressly directed the retroactive application” of the 
 
Greenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 451 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D.D.C. 2006); Bodoff v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 424 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 2006); Ben Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 425 
F. Supp. 2d 56 (D.D.C. 2006); Stern v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F. Supp. 2d 286 (D.D.C. 
2003); Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258 (D.D.C. 2003); Weinstein v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2002); Mousa v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
238 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001); Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1 
(D.D.C. 2000). Several cases related to the Arab-Israeli conflict are also discussed in Matter of 
Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litigation, 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 46–59 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 135. Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 8. 
 136. Id. at 12. Congress passed the Flatow Amendment to help Flatow bring his lawsuit. 
 137. Id. at 9–10. Those leaders include Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who remains Supreme 
Leader of Iran, Profile: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
3018932.stm (last updated June 17, 2009, 13:22 GMT), and former President Ali Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, who continues to chair both the Assembly of Experts, which is responsible for 
appointing the Supreme Leader, and the Expediency Council, which handles legislative 
disputes, Profile: Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
middle_east/4104532.stm (last updated June 19, 2009, 11:47 GMT). 
 138. Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 6. The court noted that “[t]he Islamic Republic of Iran is an 
experienced litigant in the United States federal court system.” Id. at 6 n.1. When the plaintiff 
attempted to serve Iran through the mail, the envelope was returned with “DO NOT USA” 
written across it. Id. 
 139. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1994)). 
 140. Id. at 9. 
 141. Id. at 9–10. 
 142. Id. at 10. 
 143. Id. at 12–13. 
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State Sponsor of Terrorism Amendment and “international terrorism 
is subject to universal jurisdiction,” the court found that “[d]efendants 
had adequate notice that their actions were wrongful and susceptible 
to adjudication in the United States.”144 Moreover, the court held 
extraterritorial application of the statutes proper, since applying them 
only to countries listed as state sponsors of terrorism did not interfere 
in foreign affairs.145 
The court found that it had subject matter jurisdiction, 
determining that the statutory requirements had been met.146 The 
court held that a suicide bombing constituted “extrajudicial killing.”147 
“[T]he routine provision of financial assistance to a terrorist group in 
support of its terrorist activities” qualified as “providing material 
support or resources” under the statute.148 There was no requirement 
that “a plaintiff . . . establish that the material support . . . provided by 
a foreign state for a terrorist act contributed directly to the act.”149 
Finally, the court found that if the state-sponsored terrorism 
exception applied, personal jurisdiction was established.150 The court 
awarded Flatow $22.5 million in compensatory damages and $225 
million in punitive damages.151 
 
 144. Id. at 13–14. 
 145. Id. at 16. 
 146. Id. at 16–19. The requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) are: 
(1) that personal injury or death resulted from an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, 
aircraft sabotage, or hostage taking; and (2) the act was either perpetrated by the 
foreign state directly or by a non-state actor which receives material support or 
resources from the foreign state defendant; and (3) the act or the provision of 
material support or resources is engaged in by an agent, official or employee of the 
foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, agency or employment; 
and (4) that the foreign state be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism either at 
the time the incident complained of occurred or was later so designated as a result of 
such act; and (5) if the incident complained of occurred within the foreign state 
defendant’s territory, plaintiff has offered the defendants a reasonable opportunity to 
arbitrate the matter; and (6) either the plaintiff or the victim was a United States 
national at the time of the incident; and (7) similar conduct by United States agents, 
officials or employees within the United States would be actionable. 
Id. at 16 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)). This provision was repealed in 
2008 and replaced with 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 147. Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 18. 
 148. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)). 
 149. Id. (citing § 1605(a)(7)). 
 150. Id. at 19–23. 
 151. Id. at 5. The $225 million figure was three times Iran’s alleged annual expenditure on 
terrorist activities. Id. at 34; see also Bill Miller & Barton Gellman, Judge Tells Iran to Pay 
Terrorism Damages; $247 Million Award for Family of U.S. Victim in Gaza Strip, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 12, 1998, at A1 (discussing the outcome of the Flatow case). 
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C. The Struggle to Enforce the Judgment 
After receiving his judgment, Stephen Flatow attempted to 
enforce it by attaching an arbitral award granted to Iran by the Iran–
United States Claim Tribunal152 and rental proceeds and real estate 
owned by Iran in Washington, D.C.—including the former Iranian 
embassy.153 The United States intervened in both cases to argue that 
the attachments should be quashed, and the court agreed.154 Despite 
these setbacks, Flatow persisted in trying to enforce his judgment.155 
He criticized the U.S. government for blocking his attempt to attach 
Iranian property and insinuated that the Clinton administration was 
weak on terrorism,156 leading others to question the propriety of 
allowing suits against state-sponsors of terrorism.157 Eventually, 
Flatow received a portion of his judgment through congressional 
action.158 In this and similar cases, the U.S. Treasury has paid more 
than $390 million to those with judgments against Iran.159 Despite 
 
 152. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 74 F. Supp. 2d 18, 19 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 153. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16, 18 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 154. Id. (granting U.S. motion to quash attachment which the government argued would 
violate the Foreign Missions Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4316 (2006), and the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95); Flatow, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 
20 (granting U.S. motion to quash attachment because the United States had sovereign 
immunity). 
 155. See, e.g., Bill Miller & John Mintz, Once-Supportive U.S. Fights Family Over Iranian 
Assets, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1998, at A8 (“The award in the Flatow case has left the U.S. 
government in a painful dilemma.”). 
 156. See Stephen M. Flatow, Op-Ed., In This Case, I Can’t be Diplomatic; I Lost a Child to 
Terrorism; Now I’m Losing U.S. Support, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1999, at B2 (“But when I tried to 
use the law, I found the U.S. government wasn’t really in my corner . . . . [The administration] 
continue[s] to say that carrying out my judgment would endanger the security of the United 
States. If that’s true, I’m the bad guy.”); Stephen M. Flatow, Op-Ed., Keep Fighting, 
JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 1, 1998, at 10 (“Now, I find myself in the surreal position of being 
opposed by the State Department in my attempts to enforce our judgment against Iranian assets 
located in the United States.”). 
 157. See, e.g., Editorial, Lawsuits and Terrorism, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1999, at B6 
(“Congress never should have passed, nor President Clinton signed, a law that could only offer 
Mr. Flatow justice by depriving the administration of control over important instruments of 
foreign policy. This law should be repealed.”). 
 158. ELSEA, supra note 130, at 15–16. The statute granted plaintiffs in cases against Cuba 
and Iran that had been filed or would be handed down by a certain date the option of accepting 
compensatory damages from the U.S. Treasury in return for ceding certain rights, including the 
right to attach certain categories of property. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection 
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 2002, 114 Stat. 1464, 1543. Flatow received just over $26 
million—his compensatory damages plus interest. ELSEA, supra note 130, at 69. 
 159. ELSEA, supra note 130, at 69–71 tbl.A-1. Many of these cases, however, concerned 
Iran’s other terrorist activities in the Middle East not directly related to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, § 
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these payments, as of March 2008 twenty-nine judgments against Iran 
remained outstanding and not covered under any legislation.160 It is 
unclear how these plaintiffs will be compensated, as the value of their 
judgments far exceeds the estimated $1.1 million in blocked and $51 
million in nonblocked Iranian assets in the United States.161 
The difficulty of collecting on these judgments led Chief Judge 
Royce Lamberth of the D.C. District Court—who wrote the Flatow 
opinion and heard many of the other cases against Iran—to conclude 
that “[c]ivil litigation against Iran under the FSIA state sponsor of 
terrorism exception represents a failed policy” because “these cases 
do not achieve justice for victims, are not sustainable and threaten to 
undermine the president’s foreign policy initiatives.”162 For instance, 
Judge Lamberth estimated Iranian assets in the United States at $45 
million and the outstanding judgments against Iran at $10 billion.163 
Yet Congress’s enactment of the new 28 U.S.C. § 1605A only serves 
to “stoke the flames of unrealistic and unmanageable expectations in 
these terrorism victims.”164 Judge Lamberth also expressed concern 
that these suits could interfere with the Obama administration’s goal 
of engagement with Iran.165 Although the court indicated that it will 
continue to apply the law in these suits,166 Judge Lamberth 
“respectfully urge[d] the President and Congress to seek meaningful 
reforms in this area of law in the form of a viable alternative to 
private litigation.”167 In Judge Lamberth’s view, only Congress and the 
president can “resolve the intractable political dilemmas that frustrate 
these lawsuits.”168 
Despite the numerous criticisms of the lawsuits against Iran, 
Congress has continued to enact the statutory authority that enables 
 
686, 116 Stat. 1350, 1411 (2002), and the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), Pub L. 
No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322, added additional plaintiffs. In addition, section 201 of TRIA made 
frozen assets of terrorist states available for attachment. ELSEA, supra note 130, at 21–23. 
 160. ELSEA, supra note 130, at 72–74. 
 161. Id. at 75. 
 162. In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 37 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 38. 
 165. See id. (“Today, at the start of a new presidential administration . . . it may be time for 
our political leaders here in Washington to seek a fresh approach.”). 
 166. See id. at 140 (“[T]his Court wishes to stress that it . . . will endeavor to see to it that 
plaintiffs in these actions get all the relief to which they are entitled under the law.”). 
 167. Id. at 38. 
 168. Id. 
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them169—and it makes institutional sense to do so. Congress can 
appear tough on terrorism by authorizing suits on behalf of 
constituents injured by terrorism while outsourcing responsibility for 
the litigation to plaintiffs, their attorneys, and the judicial branch. The 
executive’s responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs makes it 
more sensitive to the impact of these suits on U.S. foreign relations, 
but even that branch is likely to refrain from intervening too 
vigorously on behalf of states like Iran for political reasons. Although 
the Obama administration has indicated a willingness to reach out to 
Iran,170 it remains unlikely that either Congress or the executive will 
take action to prevent suits against an unfriendly regime. 
IV.  SUITS AGAINST ISRAEL AND ITS OFFICIALS 
Though courts have allowed suits against Iran to go forward, this 
Part discusses how judges have refused to abrogate Israeli sovereign 
immunity to permit plaintiffs to sue Israel in U.S. courts. 
In Belhas v. Ya’alon,171 the relatives of civilians who died or were 
injured when an errant Israeli shell hit the U.N. compound in Qana, 
Lebanon, sued Israeli General Moshe Ya’alon under the ATS and the 
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA)172 for war crimes and 
extrajudicial killing.173 
In upholding the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, the D.C. Circuit did not allow the plaintiffs to 
engage in what the court considered an end-run around the FSIA.174 
The court found it dispositive that the plaintiffs had only alleged acts 
 
 169. See supra notes 130–33 and accompanying text. 
 170. See, e.g., Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks at Hradcany Square, 
Prague, Czech Republic (Apr. 5, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ 
Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered (“My administration will seek 
engagement with Iran based on mutual interests and mutual respect.”). 
 171. Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 172. TVPA, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note 
(2006)). 
 173. Id. at 1281–82. General Ya’alon was the Head of Army Intelligence of the Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF) during Operation Grapes of Wrath when the shelling of Qana occurred. 
He was retired and serving as a fellow in a Washington, D.C., think tank when he was served 
with process in the suit. Id. at 1281. 
 174. See id. at 1283 (“Instead of suing the foreign state of Israel, something prohibited by 
the FSIA in the absence of allegation of any of the statutory exceptions, Plaintiffs sued a retired 
Israeli general with at most a tangential relationship to the events at issue who made a 
convenient visit to the District of Columbia.”). 
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Ya’alon performed in his official capacity, as authorized by Israel.175 
The court held that an individual can qualify as an agent or 
instrumentality of a foreign state for purposes of the FSIA.176 
Extending FSIA immunity to Ya’alon, the court also rejected the 
plaintiffs’ contention that the FSIA does not apply to foreign officials 
once they have left office.177 The plaintiffs also alleged that General 
Ya’alon’s actions violated jus cogens norms of international law and 
must therefore be outside the scope of his duties.178 The court, 
however, declined to create a jus cogens exception to the FSIA in the 
absence of specific congressional authorization.179 
In another case against Israeli officials, Doe I v. State of Israel,180 
a group of Palestinians—most of whom are U.S. citizens—living in 
Israel, the West Bank, and the United States, sued various defendants 
including Israeli leaders and settlers, as well as the settlers’ American 
supporters.181 Basing their claims on numerous statutes—including the 
ATS and the TVPA—the plaintiffs alleged genocide, war crimes, and 
conspiracy to commit racketeering, all stemming from Israel’s 
occupation of the West Bank.182 In dismissing the case, the district 
court held that the FSIA protects Israeli officials acting in their 
official capacities, and that “the personal capacity suits amount to 
suits against the officers for being Israeli government officials.”183 The 
 
 175. Id. at 1282–83. 
 176. Id. at 1292 (citing El-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).  
 177. Belhas, 515 F.3d at 1286. In another case, relatives of those injured or killed in the 
IDF’s 2002 bombing of a Gaza apartment complex sued Avraham Dichter, the director of the 
Israeli Security Agency. Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 2009). The State Department 
expressed the view that the FSIA affords sovereign immunity to countries, not to individuals. Id. 
at 11. The Second Circuit held that even if Dichter was not entitled to immunity under the 
FSIA, he was entitled to common-law immunity. Id. at 15. The Supreme Court settled the 
question of whether the FSIA applies to foreign officials acting in their official capacity, holding 
that the FSIA does not grant immunity to such individuals, though it did not address whether 
common-law immunity attaches. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2286–92 (2010).  
 178. Belhas, 515 F.3d at 1286 (“[A] jus cogens norm . . . ‘is a norm accepted and recognized 
by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted . . . .’” (quoting Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir. 
1992) (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331))). For an argument that the court should have found Ya’alon’s actions to be a jus cogens 
violation, see Ogilvy, supra note 5, at 195. 
 179. Belhas, 515 F.3d at 1287–88. 
 180. Doe I v. State of Israel, 400 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 181. Id. at 95–96. The American defendants included President George W. Bush, Secretary 
of State Colin Powell, and several defense contractors. Id. at 96. 
 182. Id. at 97. 
 183. Id. at 105. 
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court also rejected the plaintiffs’ contention of a jus cogens exception 
to the FSIA.184 It did recognize, however, that some courts had 
permitted violations of jus cogens norms to strip FSIA immunity.185 
The court’s broader concern was that the case was nonjusticiable: 
It is hard to conceive of an issue more quintessentially political in 
nature than the ongoing Israeli–Palestinian conflict . . . . 
  Plaintiffs would have this Court adjudicate the rights and 
liabilities of the Palestinian and Israeli people, making 
determinations on such issues as to whom the land in the West Bank 
actually belongs. Plaintiffs ask this Court to declare that Israel’s self-
defense policies are tantamount to terrorism, racketeering, or some 
other form of illegal activity. The Court can do none of this.186 
This statement is characteristic of how courts have handled these 
cases. Absent specific authorization from Congress to abrogate Israeli 
sovereign immunity, courts generally have refused to do so. 
Moreover, although courts have occasionally found the FSIA 
inapplicable in suits against officials of foreign states based on 
violations of jus cogens norms, they have generally granted immunity 
to Israeli officials and are unlikely to recognize a jus cogens exception 
in such cases.187 
This category of cases yields four conclusions. First, as Doe I 
demonstrates, U.S. courts have generally recognized the political 
nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel’s status as a U.S. ally, and 
the major role that the region plays in U.S. foreign policy and 
domestic politics.188 Second, the courts have been reluctant to 
abrogate the sovereign immunity of Israel or former Israeli officials 
for acts committed within the scope of their official duties. The law in 
this area, however, is unsettled. Since Belhas and Doe I were decided, 
the Supreme Court has held that the FSIA does not apply to provide 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. (citing Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994); Chuidian v. 
Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1106 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 186. Id. at 111–12 (citations omitted). 
 187. Numerous circuit courts have refused to recognize a jus cogens exception. E.g., Smith v. 
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that 
Congress did not intend a jus cogens exception to the FSIA). 
 188. See, e.g., Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The United States . . . filed a 
Statement of Interest . . . recognizing Dichter’s entitlement to immunity. . . . [E]ven if Dichter, 
as a former foreign official, is not categorically eligible for immunity under the FSIA . . . he is 
nevertheless immune from suit under common-law principles . . . .”). 
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immunity to foreign government officials acting in their official 
capacity.189 The Court emphasized, however, that it was not deciding 
whether officials may still be entitled to common law immunity.190 In 
Matar v. Dichter,191 the Second Circuit decided an Israeli official was 
entitled to precisely such common law immunity for his official acts.192 
Third, unlike the cases against the PA and Iran, the Israeli defendants 
have more vigorously defended themselves.193 Finally, the courts 
recognize justiciability concerns because both Congress and the 
executive have strong policy positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 
Belhas and Doe I, the courts recognized these suits as fundamentally 
against Israel itself.194 They refused to allow such an end-run around 
Israeli sovereign immunity. In contrast to suits against the PA and 
Iran, therefore, courts resolving suits against Israel have directly 
considered the political and foreign policy implications of ruling on 
the matter before deciding to dismiss the suits. The courts make no 
fine-grained distinctions between political cases and political 
questions, nor do they find these claims to be ordinary torts. 
V.  CORRIE V. CATERPILLAR: CHALLENGING SALES TO ISRAEL 
This Part examines a suit against Caterpillar,195 a U.S. 
corporation, for selling a bulldozer to Israel which ran over and killed 
the plaintiffs’ daughter. The case was ultimately dismissed on political 
question grounds, but it could mark the creation of a new category of 
litigation relating to the conflict. Just as plaintiffs have increasingly 
brought suits against corporations for alleged complicity in human 
rights violations, litigants will likely continue to bring suits against 
companies based on their sales of military equipment to Israel. 
 
 189. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2286–92 (2010) (holding that a Somali official was 
not entitled to immunity for his official acts under the FSIA). 
 190. Id. at 2292–93. 
 191. Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 192. Id. at 14. 
 193. See supra notes 171–76, 180–86 and accompanying text. 
 194. See Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Instead of suing the 
foreign state of Israel, something prohibited by the FSIA . . . Plaintiffs sued a retired Israeli 
general with at most a tangential relationship to the events at issue who made a convenient visit 
to the District of Columbia.”); Doe I v. State of Israel, 400 F. Supp. 2d 86, 111–13 (D.D.C. 2005) 
(refusing to adjudicate the merits of Israeli defense measures and the Israeli occupation of the 
West Bank). 
 195. Caterpillar has also been the target of a public relations campaign decrying its sales to 
Israel. Caterpillar Campaign, U.S. CAMPAIGN TO END THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION, 
http://www.endtheoccupation.org/section.php?id=158 (last visited Aug. 30, 2010). 
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Rachel Corrie, a U.S. citizen, was killed in the Gaza Strip in 2003 
when she was run over by an IDF bulldozer manufactured by 
Caterpillar.196 Rather than sue Israeli leaders, her family—as well as 
Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza—sued Caterpillar for 
violations of international law, racketeering, and wrongful death.197 
The district court determined that Caterpillar’s sale of a legal, 
nondefective product did not violate a norm of international law 
sufficient to establish an ATS claim.198 The court also held the matter 
nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine, as the executive 
and legislative branches had approved the U.S. policy of selling 
weapons and other goods to Israel.199 Furthermore, the court found 
that the act of state doctrine applied because the plaintiffs were 
asking the court to pass judgment on official military acts of Israel.200 
Thus, the court dismissed the case.201 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed.202 On appeal it emerged that the U.S. 
government had paid for Israel’s purchases of bulldozers.203 The court 
found this fact decisive in applying the political question doctrine,204 
given that it was unable to reconcile the U.S. government’s 
participation in the sale with the plaintiffs’ claims that such sales were 
 
 196. Gwynne Skinner, War Crimes Litigation in U.S. Courts: The Caterpillar Case 2 
(Palestine Ctr., Information Paper No. 9, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1304839. 
 197. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc. (Corrie I), 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1023–24 (W.D. Wash. 2005), 
aff’d, 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007). See generally SKINNER, supra note 196 (providing 
background on the incident and the case). 
 198. Corrie I, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 1026. The Supreme Court has held that the standard for an 
ATS claim is whether it “rest[s] on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized 
world and defined with a specificity comparable to the 18th-century paradigms we have 
recognized.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004). 
 199. Corrie I, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 1032 (“[N]either of the other branches of government has 
urged or enjoined sale of weapons to Israel nor restrained trade with Israel in any other manner. 
For this court to preclude sales of Caterpillar products to Israel would be to make a foreign 
policy decision and to impinge directly upon the prerogatives of the executive branch of 
government.”). 
 200. Id. (“The Act of State Doctrine . . . precludes United States courts from judging the 
validity of a foreign sovereign’s official acts . . . .”). 
 201. Id. at 1033. 
 202. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc. (Corrie II), 503 F.3d 974, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 203. Id. at 978. 
 204. Id. at 982–83. 
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wrongful.205 Thus, although the plaintiffs could still sue in Israeli 
courts,206 U.S. courts were not open to their claim. 
Had the Ninth Circuit allowed the plaintiffs’ claim to proceed, 
the plaintiffs would have faced difficulties proving causation—the 
IDF soldiers’ use of the bulldozers likely would have constituted an 
intervening cause. Yet the court instead dismissed the case based on 
the political question doctrine, refusing to rule on the propriety of 
American aid to Israel in light of contemporary congressional and 
executive policy.207 Though some have argued that the court 
improperly applied the doctrine in this case,208 it is difficult to see how 
the court could have decided this case without making a judgment 
about U.S. foreign policy.209 Had the court found Caterpillar liable, it 
would have directly contradicted foreign policy and declared 
American aid to Israel to be culpable conduct.210 Yet in other contexts 
courts have seemed more receptive to litigation seeking to hold 
corporations liable for aiding and abetting human rights violations.211 
The difference here, however, is the importance of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict in U.S. foreign policy and the alliance between the United 
States and Israel.212  
VI.  LESSONS FROM THESE CASES 
Having reviewed five categories of civil litigation related to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, this Part draws several lessons from an analysis 
of these cases. First, the courts do not apply the political question 
doctrine uniformly in these cases. Second, courts have been sensitive 
to the politics involved in litigation surrounding the conflict and have 
 
 205. Id. at 982–84. 
 206. The Corries recently filed a civil suit against the Israeli Ministry of Defense in an Israeli 
court. Rachel Corrie Relatives Sue Israel over Her Death, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/8558701.stm (last updated Mar. 10, 2010, 13:02 GMT). 
 207. Corrie II, 503 F.3d at 984. 
 208. See SKINNER, supra note 196, at 29 (“The plaintiffs do not challenge U.S. policy toward 
Israel, nor do they seek a judgment on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rather, they seek 
compensation for certain home demolitions and deaths that violated the law. The Political 
Question Doctrine should not result in the dismissal of the case on these grounds.”). 
 209. See Corrie II, 503 F.3d at 982 (“[E]ach claim unavoidably rests on the singular premise 
that Caterpillar should not have sold its bulldozers to the IDF.”). 
 210. Id. at 984. (“A court could not find in favor of the plaintiffs without implicitly 
questioning, and even condemning, United States foreign policy toward Israel.”). 
 211. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 191 (2d Cir. 2009) (reversing dismissal 
of a suit against Pfizer for nonconsensual medical tests of an antibiotic on Nigerian children). 
 212. See supra notes 186, 203–06 and accompanying text. 
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generally deferred to the judgment of at least one of the political 
branches. Third, the high proportion of default judgments in these 
cases results in important issues not being litigated. Finally, an 
important caveat is in order. Given the prevalence of default 
judgments and the lack of long-established precedent, these lessons 
are tentative and subject to future revision as these cases continue to 
work through the courts. 
A. Courts Make Distinctions in Applying the Political  
Question Doctrine 
The cases examined in previous Parts demonstrate that U.S. 
courts do not apply the political question doctrine uniformly to 
refrain from involvement in all cases involving the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Despite the particularly contentious nature of the conflict, 
when plaintiffs have sued under the ATA and the state sponsor of 
terrorism exception to the FSIA, courts have refused to dismiss the 
cases on political question grounds. The courts in cases such as Knox 
and Flatow have construed suits against the PA, PLO, and Iran as 
ordinary tort cases, placing them firmly in the realm of judicial 
resolution.213 In suits against Iran, courts have found liability under 
the state sponsor of terrorism exception despite executive branch 
opposition to courts considering such cases.214 
Yet when no such explicit congressional authorization exists, the 
courts have been more willing to dismiss lawsuits on political question 
grounds. The Corrie court applied the political question doctrine, 
declining to decide whether Caterpillar was liable for Rachel Corrie’s 
death as a result of supplying U.S.-financed bulldozers to Israel.215 
Similarly, courts have refused to grant sovereign immunity to the PA, 
ruling that decisions of recognition are political questions for the 
executive branch.216 Thus, when specific authorization exists, the 
courts have generally not heeded the views of Judge Bork or Judge 
Robb that ruling on liability for international terrorism would 
interfere with the executive branch’s conduct of foreign policy.217 Nor 
have the courts viewed cases related to the Arab-Israeli conflict as 
entirely off-limits based solely on its contentious nature. 
 
 213. See supra Parts I.C and III.B. 
 214. Murphy, supra note 52, at 80–81. 
 215. See supra Part V. 
 216. E.g., Knox v. PLO (Knox I), 306 F. Supp. 2d 424, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 217. See supra Part I.A. 
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B. Courts Show Deference to at Least One of the Political Branches 
The courts have not applied the political question doctrine in a 
uniform fashion, and politics have played a role in decisions about 
whether to invoke it. Indeed, the courts have admitted as much in 
reiterating that the political question “doctrine is one of political 
questions, not political cases.”218 The courts recognize that they are 
being called upon to make sensitive judgments in cases fraught with 
political concerns. In all of these cases, the courts have therefore 
tread cautiously in interpreting statutes and in speculating about the 
position of the executive branch. 
The courts have frequently invited the executive branch to 
participate in these cases by filing a statement of interest; the 
executive branch, however, has only selectively become involved. It 
has communicated its position that an Israeli leader should enjoy 
immunity for his official acts,219 and it has opined that Caterpillar 
should not be held liable for its sale of bulldozers to Israel.220 It has 
also intervened to prevent the attachment of certain Iranian assets,221 
and it designates certain countries as state sponsors of terrorism. At 
the same time, the executive branch did not intervene in suits against 
the PA and PLO to argue that such suits were counter to U.S. policy. 
Nor did it intervene to argue against the abrogation of Iran’s 
sovereign immunity. In addition, both President Clinton and 
President Bush signed into law statutes that plaintiffs have used to 
sue terrorists and their supporters. 
Political considerations underlie these decisions, and the courts 
have largely deferred to the judgment of at least one of the political 
branches in deciding whether to rule on these cases. Congress has 
provided statutes under which the PA, PLO, Iran, and other alleged 
supporters of terrorism can be sued; it has not done so in the case of 
Israel, a U.S. ally. The courts have deferred to the policy judgment 
implicit in these congressional actions. The judiciary has generally 
deferred to the judgment of the executive branch as well, proceeding 
 
 218. See supra notes 43, 59 and accompanying text. 
 219. Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 220. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance, Corrie v. 
Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-36210). 
 221. See, e.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16, 18 (D.D.C. 1999) 
(describing how the United States moved to quash attachment of Iranian diplomatic property); 
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 74 F. Supp. 2d 18, 19 (D.D.C. 1999) (describing how the 
United States moved to quash the attachment of an arbitral award). 
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when a statute exists and the executive does not intercede and 
dismissing cases when the opposite is true.  
Yet the reality is more complex. The courts are caught in the 
middle between a Congress pushing civil litigation against terrorism 
and an executive branch reluctantly acquiescing in such suits.222 For 
instance, the Departments of State and Justice opposed the State 
Sponsor of Terrorism Amendment to the FSIA out of concern that it 
would interfere with the executive branch’s conduct of foreign policy 
and make the United States an outlier among the international 
community.223 Yet this opposition has generally not translated into 
active involvement in suits against Iran, except to prevent the 
attachment of certain Iranian assets. The criticisms of the executive 
branch for its weakness on terrorism as a result of those interventions 
demonstrate the potential political consequences of intervening to 
urge dismissal of suits against Iran. Similarly, in Knox the United 
States refrained from intervening on behalf of the PA. Again, 
political considerations likely played a role.224 Thus, though the 
executive branch’s circumspect involvement in these cases likely 
stems from political considerations rather than from support for the 
litigation, its lack of involvement in many of these cases has left the 
courts to rely on Congress for direction. 
C. Significant Issues in These Cases Have Not Been Litigated 
Finally, it is significant that those cases that have proceeded to 
judgment have usually been the result of defaults, obviating the need 
for the plaintiffs to prove their cases in a contested forum.225 A default 
judgment results in the plaintiffs’ evidence not being scrutinized as 
carefully as it would be in a contested, fully litigated case. Since Iran, 
the PA, and the PLO failed to contest the initial suits and thus had 
 
 222. See In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 127 (D.D.C. 
2009) (“[T]his Court itself is . . . stuck in the middle and forced to referee these highly charged 
and highly political disputes . . . in something of a political quagmire . . . .”). 
 223. Murphy, supra note 52, at 80–81. 
 224. See Kessler, supra note 69 (reporting that intervention could force a choice between 
compensation for terrorist victims and support for the PA). 
 225. See Walter W. Heiser, Civil Litigation as a Means of Compensating Victims of 
International Terrorism, 3 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 1, 35 (2002) (“[T]he federal district courts have 
entered default judgments . . . often after evidentiary hearings that resemble non-jury trials, 
albeit one-sided trials.”); John D. Shipman, Comment, Taking Terrorism to Court: A Legal 
Examination of the New Front in the War on Terrorism, 86 N.C. L. REV. 526, 534 (2008) (“As a 
result of these default judgments, many aspects of the AEDPA remain untested almost a 
decade after it was enacted.”). 
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default judgments entered against them, courts did not subsequently 
need to deviate from the key findings of fact in those initial cases in 
order to establish liability. 
Despite the number of judgments awarded against the PA, PLO, 
and Iran, the statutes under which the claims were brought have not 
truly been tested. Proving causation in the context of support for 
terrorism, as the court required in Boim,226 has proven to be a 
significant challenge for plaintiffs. As the Knox II court noted, 
defendants charged with material support may very well be able to 
show that they were not responsible for the acts of terrorists.227 By 
defaulting, however, the defendants in many cases have made the 
results a foregone conclusion. 
VII.  EVALUATING THE DESIRABILITY AND EFFICACY OF  
THIS LITIGATION 
Aside from providing specific lessons, these cases also raise 
questions about the desirability and efficacy of private civil litigation 
against terrorism. Numerous commentators have defended these suits 
as a useful tool in the fight against terrorism.228 Critics, however, have 
described them as “inequitable, unpredictable, occasionally costly to 
the U.S. taxpayer and damaging to the foreign policy and national 
security goals of this country.”229 This final Part examines the impact 
of these cases on civil litigation against terrorism in general. It does so 
through the lens of seven arguments typically advanced for and 
against such litigation: compensation, symbolic justice, deterrence, 
impact on U.S. foreign policy, bias in U.S. foreign policy, the 
prevalence of default judgments, scope of liability, and First 
Amendment concerns. This Part concludes that, despite the mixed 
results of these cases, such suits are nonetheless a desirable tool in the 
fight against terrorism. 
 
 226. See supra Part II. 
 227. Knox v. PLO (Knox II), 248 F.R.D. 420, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 228. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 6, at 5 (“There is considerable reason to believe that the 
civil justice system has substantial, underutilized potential in the war against terrorism.”); 
Strauss, supra note 52, at 682 (“[T]he time has come for private citizens to enter the battle 
[against terrorism] on civil grounds through lawsuits aimed at crippling terrorist organizations at 
their foundation—their assets, funding, and financial backing.”). 
 229. Adam Liptak, U.S. Courts’ Role in Foreign Feuds Comes Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
3, 2003, at A1 (quoting William H. Taft IV, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State). 
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A. Compensation 
One strong argument in favor of these suits is their potential to 
provide the victims of terrorism or their decedents with just 
compensation.230 Courts have viewed these suits as ordinary tort 
actions brought by one who has suffered harm.231 The plaintiffs in 
these cases are thus deserving of compensation, but such 
compensation is unlikely without access to the U.S. civil justice 
system for several reasons.232 First, other countries have higher 
jurisdictional thresholds and are more reluctant than the United 
States to permit foreign nationals to bring such actions in their courts, 
especially against foreign states.233 Second, given the international 
community’s difficulty in achieving agreement on the definition of 
terrorism,234 it is unlikely that international bodies would respond 
favorably to these suits.235 Third, although the U.S. government 
established a compensation fund for the victims of the September 11 
attacks, no such fund is available to the victims of smaller terrorist 
 
 230. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 6, at 8 (“Compensation for victims of terrorism has been 
woefully neglected.”). 
 231. Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991); Knox v. PLO 
(Knox I), 306 F. Supp. 2d 424, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 248 F.R.D. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 232. See Murphy, supra note 52, at 76–77 (noting the difficulty of suing terrorists abroad and 
that “only the United States has claimed . . . the right to assert jurisdiction over states for 
tortious acts they commit abroad”); Hamish Hume & Gordon Dwyer Todd, Ambulance 
Chasing for Justice: How Private Lawsuits for Civil Damages Can Help Combat International 
Terror, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Dec. 1, 2003), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/pubID.118/ 
pub_detail.asp (arguing that the United States “has become a world leader in providing a 
judicial forum for private rights of action against foreign terror groups and the regimes that 
support them”). 
 233. See Shipman, supra note 225, at 549 (“[S]ubjecting foreign defendants to the American 
legal system based upon mere ‘minimum contacts’ is regarded by many in the international 
community as an ‘exorbitant’ basis of federal jurisdiction.” (quoting Joseph W. Dellapenna, 
Civil Remedies for International Terrorism, 12 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 169, 211 (1999))). 
 234. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795–96 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
concurring); see also Murphy, supra note 52, at 50–55 (“[I]t is still debatable whether acts of 
terrorism are crimes or torts that violate the law of nations or customary international law.”). 
 235. See Heiser, supra note 225, at 41 (“[T]he United States is not a signatory to any treaty 
that would require another country to recognize and enforce our civil judgments.”); Ruth 
Wedgwood, Civil Remedies and Terrorism, in CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM, supra 
note 6, at 157, 179 (noting that there is no global treaty on international recognition or 
execution of nonarbitral judgments). But see Moore, supra note 6, at 5 (“[T]errorist acts are not 
gray area human activities, but rather are activities that are clearly viewed as criminal in every 
legal system and are criminalized in the major U.N.-sponsored antiterrorism conventions 
embodying community consensus against such acts.”). 
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attacks or their families.236 Finally, although the U.S. could espouse 
the claims of U.S. citizen victims of terrorism, the government is 
unlikely to employ this infrequently used tool of international law.237 
On the other hand, critics argue that these suits provide “hollow 
rights”238 and false hope239 to plaintiffs who have little chance of 
enforcing their judgments.240 Indeed, the number of uncompensated 
plaintiffs undermines the compensation rationale for these suits.241 
Furthermore, even plaintiffs who have received some compensation, 
such as Stephen Flatow, have been paid out of the U.S. Treasury.242 
The reality is that the parties found liable in these suits have 
insufficient attachable assets to satisfy the judgments.243 For instance, 
in seeking relief from judgment in Knox, the PA argued that it was 
teetering on the brink of insolvency and could not afford to pay the 
judgment or the bond against it.244 Similarly, Iranian assets in the 
United States are insufficient to pay the judgments against Iran,245 and 
the courts have sided with the executive branch in quashing attempts 
to attach those assets. Congressional intervention in favor of Flatow 
and other plaintiffs has enabled them to collect only a portion of their 
judgments from the U.S. Treasury.246 Furthermore, this congressional 
 
 236. See John F. Murphy, Civil Litigation Against Terrorists and the Sponsors of Terrorism: 
Problems and Prospects, 28 REV. LITIG. 315, 341 (2008) (noting that Senator Lugar proposed a 
bill to create an alternative compensation scheme). 
 237. See Moore, supra note 6, at 8 (“[W]e have frequently neglected the victims of 
international terrorism[, and] espousal of claims . . . seem[s] to have been largely forgotten.”). 
 238. Jonathan Fischbach, Note, The Empty Pot at the End of the Rainbow: Confronting 
“Hollow-Rights Legislation” After Flatow, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1004 (2002). 
 239. In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 38 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 240. See, e.g., Baletsa, supra note 4, at 1251 (“[S]uch suits have resulted in unenforceable 
judgments that deny the victims’ families the closure and accountability they desperately 
need.”). 
 241. See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text. 
 242. See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text; see also Goldsmith & Goodman, supra 
note 127, at 146 (likening paying compensation out of the U.S. Treasury to “picking our own 
pocket” (quoting Hitting Where it Hurts: The American Taxpayer May End Up Paying Osama 
Bin Laden’s Legal Bills, ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 2001, at 57–58)). 
 243. See ELSEA, supra note 130, at 75 (showing the large discrepancy between the blocked 
and non-blocked assets of terrorist states in the United States and the outstanding damages 
owed by these states); Molora Vadnais, Comment, The Terrorism Exception to the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act: Forward Leaning Legislation or Just Bad Law?, 5 UCLA J. INT’L L. 
& FOREIGN AFF. 199, 214 (2000) (“[D]efendant states in terrorism exception cases tend to be 
those that have limited assets in the U.S.”). 
 244. Weiser, supra note 70. 
 245. ELSEA, supra note 130, at 75. 
 246. Id. at 69–71. 
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action has led to charges that better-connected plaintiffs are 
compensated while others are left holding empty judgments.247 
The record is thus decidedly mixed. Some victims have collected 
on judgments through settlement or congressional action, while 
others have not collected and may never collect. These suits have at 
times pitted the executive branch against victims of terrorism. Yet in 
the absence of these suits, the plaintiffs would likely have no recourse 
to seek compensation.248 Moreover, as in the case of Libya, it is 
possible that the United States could attempt to settle such claims as 
part of a normalization process.249 Given that the tort system is the 
primary avenue available to U.S. citizens for achieving compensation 
for intentional wrongdoing, cutting off these plaintiffs’ access would 
leave them with no possible remedy. 
B. Symbolic Justice and Historical Record 
Though monetary compensation is important to many victims 
and their families, an equally significant argument is that these suits 
provide plaintiffs the opportunity to be heard and to seek justice 
through the judicial process,250 which can help victims to heal.251 
Because it may be impossible to prosecute individual terrorists or 
their organizations, a civil suit against a funder or state sponsor may 
be these plaintiffs’ only opportunity to have their day in court.252 
Additionally, these suits provide a historical record of terrorist 
attacks.253 Although many cases result in default judgments, the 
 
 247. Fischbach, supra note 238, at 1037. 
 248. See Murphy, supra note 236, at 316 (“[U]nlike criminal prosecutions, civil suits provide 
at least the possibility that victims may be compensated . . . .”). 
 249. See Exec. Order No. 13,477, 3 C.F.R. 247 (2009) (announcing the settlement of private 
American claims against Libya pursuant to a U.S.-Libyan agreement). 
 250. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Goodman, supra note 127, at 140–41 (“Even if plaintiffs cannot 
enforce judgments obtained against terrorists, civil litigation still gives them the opportunity to 
have a day in court to tell their story publicly and to persuade a judge or jury to officially 
condemn the defendant’s acts.”). 
 251. See Shipman, supra note 225, at 569 (“While judgments rendered in American courts 
may often be unenforceable, victims may nevertheless gain some closure by establishing 
liability—a crucial part of the healing process.” (citing Seth Stratton, Taking Terrorists to Court: 
A Practical Evaluation of Civil Suits Against Terrorists Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 9 
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 27, 53 (2004))). 
 252. See Murphy, supra note 52, at 315 (“[T]he prospects for holding the perpetrators of 
international terrorism civilly liable for their actions are substantially greater than the prospects 
for holding them criminally liable.”). 
 253. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 6, at 8 (arguing in favor of civil lawsuits against terrorism as 
a means of “[t]elling the truth about terrorism”). 
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requirement that plaintiffs present sufficient evidence for the court to 
find in their favor establishes this record.254 If the case is litigated, as in 
Boim, discovery provides plaintiffs access to important documents 
and testimony regarding the defendants’ alleged support for 
terrorism.255 Even in cases that are eventually dismissed, such as 
Belhas, Doe, and Corrie, plaintiffs have the opportunity to present 
evidence of the alleged wrongdoing and their injuries. Indeed, one 
commentator has likened these suits to a “truth commission” for 
terrorist attacks.256 
C. Deterrence 
A third argument in favor of these suits is their deterrent value.257 
Securing a criminal conviction against an individual terrorist or 
terrorist entity for acts committed outside the United States is 
extremely difficult.258 Achieving accountability through the civil 
system may be easier, however, due to the lower standard of proof 
and the availability of discovery in civil litigation.259 Moreover, the 
funders and supporters of terrorism are more likely to have 
attachable assets than are the direct perpetrators.260 Courts may not 
be well-equipped to take action against terrorists in the field, but they 
are well-positioned to take action against financiers and their bank 
accounts.261 These civil suits by “private attorneys general” may 
supplement U.S. efforts to freeze terrorist assets.262 Indeed, private 
civil suits “may be more palatable and politically feasible” to 
government policymakers than criminal penalties,263 and such private 
assistance may be desirable because the government cannot “pursue 
all individuals and organizations connected by secondary 
 
 254. See supra Parts I.C, II, and III.B. 
 255. Murphy, supra note 52, at 315–16. 
 256. Wedgwood, supra note 235, at 170. 
 257. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 6, at 7 (“[I]f we can raise realistic expectations in the minds 
of these terrorists that they and their organization will be held liable for substantial monetary 
damages . . . wherever they may be, then we may be usefully adding to deterrence against 
terrorism.”). 
 258. Shipman, supra note 225, at 570. 
 259. Murphy, supra note 52, at 315–16. 
 260. Goldsmith & Goodman, supra note 127, at 144. 
 261. See, e.g., id. (arguing that the “incentive structure and operation” of private civil suits 
may be better adapted to the “control of secondary conduct”). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 143. 
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relationships.”264 Moreover, a developing international consensus 
exists that the funding of terrorism should be actionable.265 
Proponents hope that by imposing a cost on the funding of terrorism, 
these suits will deter individuals, organizations, and rogue states from 
risking their assets to do so.266 
To critics of the deterrence rationale, plaintiffs’ inability to 
enforce judgments against Iran undermines this reasoning.267 
Furthermore, measuring the impact of these cases is difficult, and 
terrorism and terrorist financing in connection with the Arab-Israeli 
conflict continues. The Boim case could have helped to discourage 
terrorist financing in the United States, but that impact is likely small 
in comparison with other U.S. antiterrorism measures. 
The cases against the PA and PLO appear to have had a greater 
impact. The PLO paid the Klinghoffers an undisclosed settlement,268 
and the PA has recently indicated its intention to contest suits against 
it in U.S. courts, which creates the possibility of discovery and greater 
transparency in PA affairs.269 Although the PA’s new strategy has yet 
to be tested, a PA that participates in these suits may take more care 
to ensure its assets and personnel are not funding terrorism. 
Moreover, Congress has repeatedly acted to authorize and expand 
plaintiffs’ ability to bring these cases.270 Although it is unlikely that 
potential civil liability in U.S. courts will ever serve as a strong 
deterrent to committed terrorists and their backers, it could help 
deter less committed supporters and force potential funding 
organizations to behave more responsibly or cease operations. 
D. Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy 
The suits against the PA, PLO, and Iran have generated a great 
deal of controversy due to their potential to interfere with the 
executive branch’s conduct of foreign affairs.271 Critics believe that 
 
 264. Id. at 143–44. 
 265. See, e.g., Wedgwood, supra note 235, at 168–69 (suggesting that the post–September 11 
international regulatory scheme redefines “what it means to be culpable in a terrorist scheme”). 
 266. See, e.g., id. at 168 (“[I]nstitutions may be indulgent or even sympathetic to violent 
actors, while supposing that the relationship . . . is too distant to carry consequence.”). 
 267. Fischbach, supra note 238, at 1025–26. 
 268. See supra Part I.A. 
 269. See supra Part I.C. 
 270. See supra Part III.A. 
 271. See Shipman, supra note 225, at 530 (describing U.S. courts as “the newest battleground 
in a struggle between the executive branch and Congress”); Anne-Marie Slaughter & David 
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these cases lead to court judgments that may be at odds with the 
executive branch’s foreign policy.272 For instance, the executive 
branch has expressed concern that utilizing Iran’s frozen assets to 
satisfy judgments against that state eliminates a bargaining chip that 
could be used in negotiations273 and presents an obstacle to 
normalization of relations.274 Along these lines, courts have imposed 
large judgments against the PA—an entity that annually receives 
millions of dollars in U.S. aid.275 These suits also lead to factfinding in 
politically sensitive areas, such as the extent of PA support for 
terrorism,276 and they could interfere with ongoing criminal or 
intelligence investigations.277 
These judgments could also potentially interfere with U.S. 
obligations under international law.278 No other country recognizes 
such extensive jurisdictional claims for civil suits against sovereign 
nations.279 Indeed, the U.S. government intervened to prevent 
attachment of Iranian diplomatic property largely because it feared 
that otherwise it would be in violation of its obligations under the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Property.280 The 
United States was also concerned about retaliation for permitting 
such suits.281 Indeed, Iran has passed a law authorizing its citizens to 
sue the United States for “terrorism.”282 
 
Bosco, Plaintiff’s Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 102, 103 (arguing that 
congressional encouragement of litigation against foreign governments in U.S. courts has 
undermined U.S. diplomacy with countries such as Cuba and Iran). 
 272. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 271, at 112. 
 273. Id. at 113–14. 
 274. Joseph Keller, The Flatow Amendment and State-Sponsored Terrorism, 28 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 1029, 1051 (2005); see also In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 
2d 31, 38 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Today, at the start of a new presidential administration—one that has 
sought engagement with Iran on a host of critical issues—it may be time for our political 
leaders . . . to seek a fresh approach.”). 
 275. Christine M. Geier, Ungar v. Palestinian Liberation Organization, 19 N.Y. INT’L L. 
REV. 173, 178–79 (2006) (“[T]his conflict . . . creates the potential for embarrassment, when our 
government recognizes the P.L.O. and the P.A. in their dealings with Israel, but not in conflicts 
with our own country.”). 
 276. Wedgwood, supra note 235, at 173. 
 277. See Murphy, supra note 52, at 62 (noting that the Attorney General is authorized to 
intervene to stay cases that may interfere with such an investigation). 
 278. Michael T. Kotlarczyk, Note, “The Provision of Material Support and Resources” and 
Lawsuits Against State Sponsors of Terrorism, 96 GEO. L.J. 2029, 2045 (2008). 
 279. Id. at 2046. 
 280. Fischbach, supra note 238, at 1015. 
 281. Kotlarczyk, supra note 278, at 2047. 
 282. Id. at 2048. 
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There are, however, numerous counterarguments. First, in the 
ten years since Flatow was decided, there is little evidence that these 
judgments have damaged U.S. foreign relations or constrained the 
executive branch significantly. Regarding Iran, for example, these 
cases have had a much smaller impact than the election of hardliner 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian nuclear program, or the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq. In addition, the FSIA contains other exceptions to 
sovereign immunity, such as for state commercial activity, and these 
exceptions have not damaged U.S. international relations 
significantly.283 Second, these judgments—which threaten a country’s 
assets and potentially require future payments in the event of 
normalization—may instead give the United States leverage by 
providing a means of establishing liability and accountability for 
terrorism when neither criminal nor international law apply.284 The 
executive branch could also dangle the possibility of supporting 
efforts to reopen judgments, as in Knox, or could seek negotiated 
settlements of claims as part of normalization, as it did with Libya.285 
Third, concerns about possible retaliation against U.S. interests 
stemming from these suits may be overstated.286 
Finally, the executive branch’s criticisms are best addressed to 
Congress, not the courts. Courts are abiding by repeated 
congressional authorization of these suits; they are not overstepping 
their bounds.287 Congress views these suits as a useful tool in the fight 
against terrorism and as a means of providing compensation to 
victims.288 The executive branch has some ability to affect the 
 
 283. David MacKusick, Comment, Human Rights v. Sovereign Rights: The State Sponsored 
Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 10 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 741, 
772–73 (1996). 
 284. See Moore, supra note 6, at 17 (“Do we really want to send the message ‘kill and 
torture Americans and we will simply ignore responsibility when the government changes?’”). 
 285. See supra notes 66–72, 249 and accompanying text. This would likely depend, however, 
on whether plaintiffs agreed to waive certain vested rights to gain some compensation. 
 286. Moore, supra note 6, at 15 (arguing that “it is strongly in our interest to have every 
nation on earth copy the 1996 FSIA amendments” and that it would be “bizarre to worry about 
a few terrorist nations allegedly proceeding against U.S. assets in a setting where they are 
perfectly willing to kill and torture Americans” (emphasis omitted)). 
 287. Hume & Todd, supra note 232 (“Congress expects U.S. courts to take an aggressive 
stance towards terrorists, criminal regimes, genocidal warriors, and the entities and individuals 
who provide their financial support.”). 
 288. Shipman, supra note 225, at 569 (“[E]nactment of terrorism-related 
statutes . . . indicate[s] the unequivocal intent of Congress that victims of terrorism be allowed 
to seek financial redress in U.S. courts.”). 
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disposition of these suits, but it has not consistently done so.289 The 
executive branch could have intervened in suits against the PA, as it 
did to stop the attachment of Iranian assets, and it has discretion over 
which countries it classifies as state sponsors of terrorism. The 
executive also could have vetoed the congressional legislation 
authorizing these cases, advocated new legislation limiting such suits, 
or sought legislation implementing an alternative compensation 
scheme. Instead, presidents have repeatedly acquiesced in Congress’s 
actions in this context. Although the executive’s course may be the 
result of sound political calculations, it is disingenuous for the 
executive to criticize the courts for exercising a power that it 
consented to give them. 
E. Bias in U.S. Foreign Policy 
Regardless of whether these suits interfere with U.S. foreign 
policy, some critics have attacked these suits for incorporating an 
alleged bias in U.S. foreign policy.290 Suits against the PA, PLO, and 
Iran have resulted in large judgments,291 while courts have dismissed 
suits against Israel, Israeli leaders, and Caterpillar.292 To these 
commentators, this contrast represents an injustice that undermines 
the legitimacy of such suits and the notion that litigants who are 
victims of Israeli actions can rely upon U.S. courts to dispense 
justice.293 When Israel or Israeli interests are at stake, the argument 
goes, U.S. courts and political branches act to protect them. 
If bias exists, however, it stems from the democratic process. 
Congress has made judgments about how to define terrorism, what 
conduct to punish, and whether to abrogate the sovereign immunity 
of terrorist states. The executive has not extended recognition to the 
PA as a sovereign state or intervened to attempt to prevent suits 
 
 289. See Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 675 F. Supp. 2d 104, 112 n.7 
(D.D.C. 2009) (noting that the executive branch has been “unhelpful” in resolving the case, did 
not file a statement of interest when asked by the court to do so, and instead filed a “mealy-
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 290. See, e.g., Keith Sealing, “State Sponsors of Terrorism” Is a Question, Not an Answer: 
The Terrorism Amendment to the FSIA Makes Less Sense Now Than It Did Before 9/11, 38 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 119, 134–41 (2003) (questioning why countries like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel 
are not on the list of state sponsors of terrorism and thus are not subject to suit). 
 291. See supra Parts I.C and III.B. 
 292. See supra Parts IV–V. 
 293. See Sealing, supra note 290, at 143 (“Putting the matter in the hands of litigators and 
haling foreign sovereigns into U.S. courts based on . . . politically motivated notions of whether 
a given nation is a ‘State Sponsor of Terrorism’ or an ‘ally’ is not the solution.”). 
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against it. Presidents have signed the legislation that abrogates the 
sovereign immunity of state sponsors of terrorism like Iran.294 Critics 
arguing that the courts are biased would more appropriately address 
their complaints to the legislative and executive branches. The courts 
simply base their rulings on the statutes approved by Congress and 
signed by the president or on the executive branch’s foreign policy 
decisions. 
F. Prevalence of Default Judgments 
A further criticism of these suits is that many of them result in 
default judgments. Critics have questioned the imposition of such 
large judgments based on defaults, in which the court reviews only the 
plaintiff’s evidence.295 Many commentators believe that plaintiffs 
would have a much harder time proving wrongdoing if these suits 
were contested.296 Indeed, the Boim case demonstrates the difficulty 
of establishing causation.297 The plaintiffs in Knox would have faced 
similar challenges had they been required to litigate the case in full.298 
The defendants, however, chose to default in these cases, and it would 
be counter to Congress’s intentions and to these suits’ compensatory 
and deterrent purposes to place the burden of defendants’ 
nonappearance on the plaintiffs. 
G. Scope of Liability and First Amendment Concerns 
A final concern, specifically with regard to the ATA, is the 
potential for liability to sweep too broadly and implicate First 
Amendment rights. The arguments of the Boim dissenters 
exemplifies this concern.299 It also played a role in the judge’s decision 
to grant the PA and PLO relief from judgment in Knox II.300 Some 
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commentators have noted that an expansive interpretation of the 
ATA could result in “interference with religious expression, free 
speech, and related association rights of persons indirectly connected 
to terrorism,” as well as “with the good works of charitable 
organizations.”301 Potential solutions include requiring the State 
Department to authorize suits under the ATA or permitting the State 
Department to intervene to prevent a suit under the ATA.302 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the many problems with these lawsuits, U.S. courts have 
proven capable of handling civil litigation related to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Labeling this litigation a failure would be premature. 
Through these lawsuits, some victims have won compensation—albeit 
through settlement and congressional action, rather than enforcement 
of judgments. Further, these suits have likely provided at least some 
measure of deterrence. The judgment in Boim will likely affect the 
willingness of U.S.-based organizations to send money to groups like 
Hamas, even if they believe that the money is going to ostensibly 
charitable purposes. The Knox case and the failure of the executive 
branch to shield the PA from liability will likely provide at least some 
impetus for the PA to oversee its personnel more carefully, especially 
with regard to their potential involvement in terrorist activities. 
Flatow and other judgments against Iran have alerted that nation that 
it will face accountability for its sponsorship of terrorism. Although 
enforcing these judgments has proven difficult, these plaintiffs likely 
could not have sought compensation through any other means. 
Furthermore, courts have shown a willingness to defer to the 
general direction provided by the political branches. To that end, the 
courts have largely followed congressional statutes—signed into law 
by the executive—in imposing liability. Courts have also deferred to 
the executive branch when it has clearly stated that a given judgment 
would interfere with U.S. foreign policy. When the executive branch 
has refrained from active participation, however, the courts have 
followed the direction of Congress. Overall, judicial involvement in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict may have a mixed record of success, but it 
has not been the unmitigated disaster critics feared. 
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